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THE ENIGMA OF HOME HEALTH CARE: INITIATIVES TO COMBAT ENDEMIC FRAUD AND
IMPROVE QUALITY OF CARE
Alec B. Deborin*
I. Introduction
On December 4, 2018, Alexander Ros Lazo, owner and operator of T.LC. Health
Services, pleaded guilty for paying kickbacks and bribes in exchange for home health care
prescriptions and referrals of Medicare beneficiaries to T.L.C., his home health agency
(“HHA”).1 Perhaps even more problematic to patient health and safety, T.L.C. had been billing
Medicare for occupational and therapy services rendered by a co-conspirator who was not even
licensed to practice therapy. 2 This $8.6 million fraud scheme is a mere snapshot of the pervasive
and harmful fraudulent practices conducted by some HHAs throughout the country which drains
limited government resources, including Medicare, and threatens patient safety in favor of
increasing patient volume and revenue. Ultimately, our aging, homebound parents and
grandparents suffer the effects of the fraudulent practices committed by various HHAs.
For hundreds of years, home health care has been the dominant form of medical care
provided to individuals. It was not until the early 20th century and advances in modern medicine
that hospitals overtook home health care services as the primary venue for the provision of
medical services. Due to an aging population and an increasingly patient-focused health care
system, home health care has once again become an increasingly relevant and crucial sector
within America’s health care system. Claiming a 3% share of overall health care expenditures in
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2017, or $97 billion, this sector has rapidly grown in recent years, acting both as a cheaper
alternative and supplement to more traditional hospitals, especially for chronic care individuals.3
Of this spending, 77% is comprised of Medicaid and Medicare expenditures, making government
expenditure a significant amount of total home health spending. 4 The trend toward home health
care has only risen in recent years: home health care has seen an approximately 20% increase in
home and community-based providers since 1995.5 This number will only continue to grow; the
Bureau of Labor Statistics projected that demand for home health aides will increase by 48%
between 2012 and 2022. 6
It is clear that America's health care system, including home health care, is a
complicated and inefficient system that needlessly raises costs. Although health care
expenditure slowed in recent years, it is projected to rise at an average rate of 5.5 percent per
year between 2018 and 2027, reaching nearly $6.0 trillion by 2027.7 As health care costs
continue to increase beyond the rate of inflation, fewer Americans will be able to afford highquality care. An increased focus on home health care may actually be part of the solution in
lowering overall costs and improving the quality of care in the American health care system: it
could provide better, individualized care while simultaneously delivering a more economically
viable alternative to hospitals.8 Indeed, home health care provides valuable services for the
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elderly and individuals with chronic conditions; a patchwork of solutions exists that can further
improve quality of care and lower cost.
Home health care, however, is a growing, multi-billion dollar industry that may be
resistant to change. The relative success of HHAs presents a double-edged sword: while home
health may provide relatively cheaper and more efficient services than hospitals, it also presents
greater opportunities for providers to commit fraud. The overarching problem of home health
care is one of artificially inflated costs, largely the result of fraudulent Medicare practices.
Rampant fraud and abuse scourged home health care in the past few decades and may get
worse.9 As more and more patients utilize home health care services, an increased proportion of
Federal program expenditures are directed toward home health. Unless incentives more closely
align between home health care and patients, HHAs have little reason to stray from their
profitable, fraudulent enterprises.
The other stumbling block home health regulators face lies in the solitary nature of
medical services allegedly provided. Unlike other types of health providers, where audits and
investigations can be conducted in the provider’s facilities, HHAs provide care and services
within the privacy of a patient’s home. Therefore, bad actors in the home health sector are more
difficult to identify. Because it is easier for HHAs to commit fraudulent billing practices and
abuse older patients with chronic conditions, HHAs are more prone to higher rates of fraud,
which include billing and claims fraud, abuse of elderly and at-risk patients, company
compliance and regulatory fraud, background check fraud, and kickbacks for wrongly certifying
and recruiting potential customers.10
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Fortunately, recent efforts to combat fraud in the American health care system extended
to home health care as well. The Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) and the Medicare Access and
CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (“MACRA”) show early returns on mitigating Medicare
fraud after placing an emphasis on curbing fraud and creating a transitional paradigm shift from
service-based care to quality and patient-centered care. The government set up task forces,
including a large contingent in Chicago, to audit providers and to ensure compliance with
regulations. In recent years, the Department of Justice effectively recouped millions of dollars
from providers. While the ACA and MACRA prove moderately effective, a more
comprehensive solution is required if the federal government wishes to control costs in a sector
plagued with fraud.
In pondering the prevention of fraud in home health care, it is important to keep in mind
that home health agencies generally provide an important service and that excessive punishment
should be avoided in cases where the provider violated a regulation through a technicality or
good-faith mistake. In some cases, providers that did not intend to commit fraud are punished to
the same degree as providers who intended to commit fraud. The best approach is to remain
vigilant, hold directors and executives accountable for fraudulent activity, and help change the
organizational structure of home health organizations to disincentivize fraud and lower costs.
II. Background
History of Home Health Care
The history of home health care is long and complicated in the United States. Beginning
in the 19th century, organized home care began with two primary functions: the provision of
midwives and to help contain the spread of contagious diseases.11 The role of home health care
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services in the American health care system steadily decreased by the 1920s, despite the
increasing number of individuals with chronic diseases due to a growing, aging population.
Private insurers no longer viewed home health as a viable means for covering chronically ill
patients or as a reasonable benefit to include in insurance plans. As hospitals assumed
responsibility for acute-care patients and private nursing homes became a viable alternative to
hospitals for chronically-ill patients, American society began to view caring for chronically ill
patients as a private matter or family responsibility. 12 By the 1960s, home health took a
diminished role in American society, being relegated to post-acute hospital care that decreased
the burden and operating capacity of hospitals. Perceived as a cheaper health care alternative
and one that emptied hospital beds, the Medicare and Medicaid Act of 1965 covered home health
but limited its use to post-acute care.13 Home health care services began to expand in the 1980s,
largely as a result of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980 (“Omnibus Act”) and several key
court rulings. By the 1990s, despite some efforts to limit the burgeoning home health industry,
home health care services expanded due to earlier hospital discharges, a decline in the amount of
nursing home space available, an aging demographic, and advances in medical technology
enabling the provision of higher quality care at home.
Home Health Defined
Home health care consists of medical services provided in a patient’s home and may
include an array of services, including skilled medical professional and nursing care, physical
therapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy, and hospice care.14 The Medicare and Medicaid
Act established certain eligibility requirements that must be met to receive home health
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coverage. A beneficiary must (1) be confined to his or her home; (2) be under the care of a
physician; (3) need intermittent skilled nursing care or certain types of physical, speech, or
occupational therapy; and (4) the care given must be medically “reasonable and necessary.” 15
An individual that satisfies those eligibility requirements qualifies for “part-time or intermittent”
nursing care or home health aides.16 Today, intermittent care consists of services provided
fewer than 7 days a week, or daily at less than 8 hours each day for up to 21 days, with
extensions allowed in extreme cases. The statutory definition of a provider in home health care,
known as a home health agency, is a “public agency or private organization, or a subdivision of
such an agency or organization, which is primarily engaged in providing skilled nursing services
and other therapeutic services. 17 HHAs must be licensed pursuant to the specific laws of the
state in which the HHA is based and must maintain clinical records on all patients. 18 While
HHAs must comply with and receive certification based on the specific requirements of its state,
most states follow federal statutes like the Medicare Act to determine HHA eligibility.
Expansion of Home Health Care
Two decades after its inclusion in Medicare, home health remained a small health care
sector that continued to provide a limited service by providing short-term, post-acute care for
patients recovering from hospital care. Seen as a small but important financial burden, it was
originally fully covered under Medicare Part A, comprising less than 1% of total Medicare
expenditures prior to the 1980s.19 Medicare spending on home health care began to significantly
increase with the Omnibus Act, which abolished the three-day hospitalization requirement
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previously attached to home care benefits, the 100-visit limit, and the $100 deductible.20 In other
words, the Omnibus Act eliminated the hospitalization requirement for home health care
beneficiaries who could theoretically receive home care if they obtained homebound status
through physician certification of their eligibility. The beneficiary also did not have to pay a copay or deductible for any traditional home health services.21 Moreover, the Omnibus Act no
longer capped the number of visits per episodic illness for home health care Medicare payments
at 100. Together, these reforms changed the original conception of home health from providing
post-hospital acute care to chronic care. Patients with chronic, long-term conditions were now
eligible to receive home health care benefits in addition to patients with short term and acutecare needs.
The number of home health care beneficiaries expanded in 1988 after a landmark
decision in Duggan v. Bowen.22 In Duggan, plaintiff Medicare recipients sought class
certification against the Department of Health and Human Services (“Department of HHS”),
challenging the Department of HHS’s “part-time or intermittent care” policy that excluded from
its definition part-time care needed for more than four days a week. Under the challenged
definition, services provided to a beneficiary after the four-day threshold would not receive
Medicare reimbursement. While the Department of HHS would normally be allowed to set
guidelines and protocols under its statute-defined scope of discretion as an administrative
agency, a court will strike down administrative protocols that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse
of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law” as prescribed under the Administrative
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Procedure Act.23 The Court clarified home health care’s “part-time or intermittent” requirement
after Medicare beneficiaries claimed that the Department of HHS construed it too narrowly by
limiting such services to four days a week. 24 The Court held that the Department of HHS’s
interpretation of “part-time or intermittent” care provision requiring a person otherwise entitled
to receive coverage for home health care on a less than full-time basis to establish that this care
was both “part-time” and “intermittent” was arbitrary and capricious and that said-beneficiaries
were entitled to coverage if they established such services as “part-time” or “intermittent.”25
The practical implications of the court’s ruling on the “intermittent care” requirement in
Duggan cannot be understated. By eliminating the four-day rule, caps on the number of
permissible visits allowed by home health care personnel per episodic illness became virtually
nonexistent. Strict visit limitations no longer constrained HHAs which could now procure
Medicare and Medicaid payments for an unlimited amount of visits as long as all other
requirements were met under § 1395 of the Act, including that visits be “medically reasonable
and necessary.” The transition of home health care as a post-acute service to chronic-care
service accelerated largely as a result of the Omnibus Act and the Duggan ruling. The number of
individuals in receipt of home health Medicare benefits grew from 1.3 million to 3.2 million
within a decade. Expenditures ballooned from $1.6 billion to $13 billion between 1983 and
1994.26 Between 1989 and 1997, the number of visits to beneficiaries rose from 27 to 63 per
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year.27 This expansion of beneficiaries occurred simultaneously with a dramatic increase in the
number of home health agencies from 5,700 to over 10,000.28
Types of Home Health Care Fraud
The dramatic increase in the size and scope of home health also brought upon an
increased incentive to commit fraud. The fraud and abuse issues in home health care typically
entail some combination of false claims, kickbacks, and self-referrals.29 In addition to the
various regulatory acts and court decisions in the 1980s and 1990s which increased Medicare
coverage for home health care, the very nature of home health care itself precipitated the
prevalent fraudulent activity existing today. According to the Office of Inspector General, the
main reasons fraud exists in home health includes the fact that beneficiaries only pay copayments on certain medical equipment but do not otherwise typically pay out-of-pocket, do not
receive explanations of benefits for bills submitted for home services, and the limited medical
supervision of non-medical personnel, such as Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(“CMS”) auditors.30 Sometimes, nurses exaggerate or outright falsify information in patient’s
charts to make them appear to be home health service eligible. 31 Other times, home service
providers periodically discharge and later re-admit patients to hide any medically unnecessary
services from regulators, without any real changes to the patient’s medical conditions. 32
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Other illegal activity includes paying and receiving kickbacks in exchange for Medicare or
Medicaid referrals which implicate the anti-kickback statute. These payments include referral
fees disguised as salaries and job opportunities, direct payments for each patient certified as
eligible for home health services, and subcontracting with retirement homes for home health
referrals. While some of the referred patients may be legitimately homebound, a requirement for
home health Medicare reimbursement, others attain false certification and receive home health
services despite their ability to freely travel in and out of their homes. The marketing of needless
home health services to beneficiaries is also a significant issue, and often occurs under the guise
of illegal kickback and false claim liability.33
False Claims Act Defined
An entity violates the False Claims Act (“FCA”) if it, “knowingly makes, uses, or causes
to be made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money
or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or
decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.” 34 Under the
False Claims Act, violators are subject to treble damages and up to $11,000 for each false
claim.35 These fraudulent claims include billing for services never rendered, duplicate claims
submitted for the same service, claims for services provided to ineligible patients, and claims for
services providers knew to be unreasonable or medically unnecessary under the circumstances.36
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The FCA also covers illegal kickbacks for entities with intent to offer of pay remuneration in
exchange for referrals.37
Laws must be enforced to be effective. Indeed, investigation and enforcement of health
care fraud has grown more sophisticated in recent years, which typically involves close
coordination between multiple public and private entities. The Department of HHS oversees the
Medicare program and routinely investigates suspicious providers potentially in violation of the
FCA. An internal unit of the Department of HHS, CMS works with many different entities,
individuals, and law enforcement to prevent and detect fraud. Unified Program Integrity
Contractors, for example, are private organizations that contract with the government to
investigate Medicare fraud and utilize a data-driven approach to predict and identify fraudulent
actors to assists CMS in this way. 38 The Health Care Fraud Prevention Partnership is a voluntary
partnership between public and private enforcers, including state agencies, law enforcement, and
private insurance plans that facilitates information sharing. 39 In some cases, nurses, patients, and
other individuals notify the government of suspected foul play as part of a qui tam lawsuit.
Past and Current Efforts in Remediating Home Health Care Fraud
Past efforts to curb fraud and overall costs in the health care sector largely centered on
reforming the Medicare reimbursement model. Traditionally, Medicare providers received
reimbursement through a fee-for-service payment model, whereby Medicare paid for the cost of
each individual service rendered. 40 This model incentivized hospitals and physicians to
maximize the number of procedures performed instead of focusing on preventative care, and to
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render medically unnecessary services, which increased overall cost.41 By 1983, with the
adoption of the Social Security amendments, acute-care inpatient hospitals adopted a prospective
payment system (“PPS”). While still a fee-for-service model, hospitals received reimbursement
based on a pre-determined rate set by CMS, regardless of the actual costs of services rendered.
Home health care, however, lagged behind and continued to use more traditional payment
methods.
Efforts to combat the burgeoning costs of home health care began with studies conducted
to test different payment models. Under the National Home Agency Prospective Payment
Demonstration of 1990, five states (California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Texas) began
testing the effectiveness of different models of a PPS for home health care services: Phase I of
the demonstration tested a payment system in which reimbursement rates were set on a per-visit
basis while Phase II, begun in 1995, tested a system in which rates were set for each “episode of
care provided,”42 defined as 120 days for the purposes of the study. The results of the Phase I
study demonstrated the need to further reduce volume of services in order achieve meaningful
cost savings.43 Under Phase II, agencies received a lump sum for the first “episode of health
care,” regardless of overall costs or number of visits made. By providing a pre-set reimbursement
rate per episode, agencies driven by maximizing profits would reduce costs per episode below
the base-payment rate.44 In its final evaluation of the effectiveness of both models, CMS found
the Phase II model to be more effective in drastically reducing the number of visits made to
patients. The average time of care fell from 131 days for cost-reimbursed agencies to 98 days for
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agencies operating under the Phase II prospective payment model.45 As for the quality of care
under a PPS model, the study found that the decreased number of visits did not significantly
impact overall patient health, although patient’s health were affected in some instances.46
Eventually, HHAs adopted a version of this payment model under the Balanced Budget
Act of 1997.47 As home health costs spiraled out of control, Bill Clinton’s administration issued
a moratorium on September 15, 1997, that required HHAs to re-enroll for licensure every three
years and increased the number of CMS audits performed on them.48 Prior to the moratorium,
Congress attempted to rein in Medicare costs with the passage of the Balanced Budget Act of
1997. The most significant measure of the Act required the Department of HHS to develop and
implement a PPS for home health services. 49 The new PPS established a method of Medicare
disbursement made on a predetermined fixed amount, based on a classification system initially
predicated on prior cost reporting data, “that eliminates the effects of variations in relative case
mix and wage levels among different home health agencies.”50 Along with a new method of
payment, the Act further required that HHAs receive payment based on the location of the
services provided rather than where the services were billed: this gave the beneficiary the right to
make written requests to physicians for an itemized statement of Medicare-covered items or
services, and redefined “part-time” and “intermittent care. 51 Further, in an effort to decrease
overall Medicare costs, the BBA stipulated that Medicare Part A would only cover up to 100
visits “per spell of illness;” Part B would cover any further visits. Overall, the BBA of 1997
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enjoyed relative success pursuing its goal to rein in home health care costs, as the average
number of visits per beneficiary fell 43% between 1997 and 1999.52 Under this new payment
model, the incentive for HHAs to make medically unnecessary patient visits decreased because
reimbursement rates stayed at a predetermined rate based on episodes of care. Still, the new
payment method could not completely overcome by the obstacles created by the Omnibus Act
and Duggan in limiting the frequency of visits or narrowing patient eligibility for home health
care.53
Renewed efforts to curtail costs and fraud in home health began with the passage of
Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization act of 2015 (“MACRA”) and the ACA. Enacted in
2015, MACRA reformed the Medicare payment structure for physician services and
implemented a series of policy changes. 54 By 2019, MACRA will transition from service-based
models such as the PPS to primarily two value-based payment models: Advanced Alternative
Payment Models (“APMs”) and the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (“MIPS”).55 MIPS
establishes a composite score based on four main factors: (1) Quality; (2) Resource Use; (3)
Clinical Practice Improvement Activities; and (4) EHR Meaningful Use.56 The composite score
determines the amount of reimbursement a provider is entitled. Providers with good scores
receive a 5% bonus in reimbursement while providers with lower scores are penalized and
receive a lower amount of reimbursement. Eligible providers under the advanced APM approach
choose to take on risk in the hopes of receiving various payment incentives.
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In 2018, CMS introduced Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Advanced (“BPCI
Advanced”), a voluntary program that provides participating HHAs the option to be reimbursed
through bundled payments.57 Bundled payments are a type of advanced APM that incentivize
providers to decrease cost and increase quality of care by giving HHAs the opportunity to
receive additional payment if they meet certain cost and quality metrics similar to those seen
under the MIPS structure. Under the BPCI program, HHAs can receive payment for 32
identified clinical episodes of care.58
Because MACRA is still in a transitional phase, most HHAs still operate under the
prospective payment model. The merit-based payment system, however, is a step in the right
direction to combat certain types of fraudulent billing and improve quality of care. By changing
the paradigm from a service-based payment method to one focused on quality and cost control,
the merit-based payment system disincentivizes HHAs from billing based on the number of visits
made to beneficiaries because this system would no longer be a fee-for-service. Bundled
payments, for instance, remove the temptation to decrease quality in order to lower costs. This
new payment model has many similarities to the PPS tested under Phase II of the Demonstration
project, which set reimbursement rates based on an episodic illness rather than a straight fee-for
service basis. MACRA reimbursement, however, hinges more on quality of care and patient
outcome rather than on services rendered under a PPS model. Despite its potential to improve
quality and decrease fraud, MACRA is not all-encompassing and will not solve certain types of
fraudulent practices, including false “homebound” certification by physicians, and referrals to
HHAs for kickbacks. A value-based payment model also presents potential downsides and policy
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concerns. As home health services have invariably switched from a post-acute service to a
longer term, chronic disease care service, HHAs would be forced to demonstrate high-quality
care for patients with conditions that may show little improvement from medical care and may
even be incurable. As a result, it may be difficult to completely transition HHAs from utilizing
prospective payment systems to APM models without structural changes to the HHAs
themselves.
In addition to reforming the reimbursement model, the Obama Administration renewed
the focus on regulatory enforcement to hold those in leadership positions more accountable over
fraudulent activity. In her 2015 Memo titled “Individual Accountability for Corporate
Wrongdoing,” Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates outlined six strategies to combat corporate
wrongdoing, including fraud in health care:

(1) in order to qualify for any cooperation credit,
corporations must provide to the Department all relevant facts
relating to the individuals responsible for the misconduct; (2)
criminal and civil corporate investigations should focus on
individuals from the inception of the investigation; (3) criminal
and civil attorneys handling corporate investigations should be in
routine communication with one another; (4) absent extraordinary
circumstances or approved departmental policy, the Department
will not release culpable individuals from civil or criminal liability
when resolving a matter with a corporation; (5) Department
attorneys should not resolve matters with a corporation without a
clear plan to resolve related individual cases, and should
memorialize any declinations as to individuals in such cases; and
(6) civil attorneys should consistently focus on individuals as well
as the company and evaluate whether to bring suit.59
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In addition to holding wrongdoers more accountable, the Yates memo also brought about
an increased government focus on medical necessity cases. Medical treatments fell under heavy
scrutiny with the help of big data analytics and auditors began to ascertain the necessity of such
treatments and procedures. Moreover, the government readily held the organization, in addition
to the individual provider, liable for these fraudulent practices. Despite these new initiatives,
however, the Trump administration may have stalled the momentum on the increased focus on
executive and corporate accountability. While the Yates Memo remains intact, money recouped
from health care fraud declined in 2018 from recent years.60
More recently, CMS issued a final rule on face-to-face requirements for home health
services effective July 1, 2016. 61 This new regulation requires physicians to document face-toface encounters, including telehealth services, with the Medicaid beneficiary for the
authorization of home health services within certain timeframe.62
In addition to recent rules and regulations designed to disincentivize fraudulent activity,
increased enforcement capabilities were spearheaded by Sally Yates and the DOJ to increase
enforcement capabilities amongst various federal agencies. Of these federal agencies, the Health
and Human Service Office of Inspector General (“HHS-OIG”) plays the most prominent role in
combating fraud and abuse, with a substantial amount of its resources going towards Medicare
and Medicaid oversight. 63 Since its inception in early 2007, HHS-OIG has improved its
capabilities through the use of Medicare Fraud Strike Force teams. These units of HHS-OIG
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investigators combine data analytics and collaborate with the FBI and other federal agencies,
state, and local law enforcement to identify health care fraud, waste, and abuse. 64 Moreover,
these teams are strategically based in locations that typically include endemic levels of home
health care fraud, such as Los Angeles, Chicago, and various cities in Florida.65 Credible
allegations of fraudulent practices are subsequently referred to CMS, who then have the ability
to immediately suspend Medicare payments to the perpetrators identified by strike force teams. 66
Since their inception, these units have been relatively successful: strike force teams operating in
12 different cities have since charged over 4,000 defendants who have collectively billed
Medicare a total of over $14 billion. 67
III. Solutions to Decrease Fraud and Improve Care
Methods to combat fraud and abuse within home health care face unique challenges, not
the least of which are HIPAA and privacy concerns, political uncertainties, difficulties of
proving intentional – therefore fraudulent – conduct, and the difficulties of auditing HHAs in
general. Despite past and current efforts to combat fraud by restructuring payment structures,
increasing the number of audits and penalties, and other forms of regulation, fraud remains an
elusive opponent to tackle through reactive means in home health. No “one-size-fits-all”
solution exists to curb fraud and reduce cost in home health care. Any solutions should be within
the spirit and confines of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement’s Triple Aim initiative to
improve the patient experience of care, the health of populations, and reducing the per capita cost

64

OIG, Medicare Fraud Strike Force, https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/strike-force/ (last visited Dec. 8, 2018).
Id.
66
Id.
67
Robert Holly, Home Health Agency Owners Sentenced to Prison: Ordered to Pay $14.1M for Fraud, HOME
HEALTH C ARE NEWS (Oct. 21, 2018), https://homehealthcarenews.com/2018/10/home-health-agency-ownerssentenced-to-prison-ordered-to-pay-14-1m-for-fraud/.
65

18

of health care.68 Home health care may require a patchwork of solutions including,
organizational structural reforms of HHAs to integrated health care systems, a commitment by
the current administration to maintain vigilance in holding individual executives more
accountable for fraudulent practices, continuing the recent trend towards a value-based payment
model, and rolling back some of the initial problems created by the Duggan Court ruling and
Omnibus Act. Other possible solutions will be addressed later in this article, such as mandating
co-payments for health care services or even transferring patients with chronic conditions from
home health care to nursing homes, but should not be implemented for a number of reasons.
Integrated Health Care Systems
The American health care system is a patchwork of fragmented industries and
organizations that needlessly increase administrative costs and decreases competition, cause
quality of care to suffer, and potentially hamper overall transparency for government regulators
and auditors. The best long-term solution to increase the quality of home health and decrease
fraud is to implement an Integrated Delivery System (“IDS”). An IDS involves integrating
HHAs with other providers to be a part of a larger industry trend of merging and consolidating
providers. An IDS that increases cooperation and improves transitional care amongst hospitals,
home health, hospice, and other health care services promise to solve major structural issues in
home health that enable fraud. IDSs may be diverse in organizational structure and there is no
clear definition on what constitutes an IDS.69 By better integrating the chain of health care
between hospitals and providing various incentives to home health agencies, the system may
help avoid some of the pitfalls that have long been endemic in home health care, including illegal
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kickbacks for patient referrals and false homebound certification. The most common IDS model
is the Accountable Care Organization (“ACO”), in which health care providers voluntarily join
together to provide coordinated care.70 Similar to the BPCI Advanced program for participating
HHAs, Medicare ACOs are typically reimbursed through bundled payments where
reimbursement rates are determined based on cost and quality metrics. 71 Other test models
considered for better integration include the Community-Based care Transitions Program
(“CCTP”), the Geriatric Resources for Assessment and Care of Elders, and Independence at
Home.72
Created under § 3026 of the ACA, the CCTP tests integration models designed to
improve the transition between hospitals and other settings like home health care in order to
reduce readmission for high-risk Medicare beneficiaries and to document measurable savings to
Medicare.73 Community-based organizations, or CBOs, offer transitional care services to lower
costs and improve quality of care. These organizations focus on social determinants to improve
health outcomes by providing access to housing, transportation, healthy food, and employment
opportunities.74 Although relatively new, these organizations have increased awareness within
the health care industry on the role social determinants play in overall health. HHAs that have
transitioned to a value-based payment model should consider partnering with CBOs as it would
improve quality of care and incentivize payment under bundled payments and other value-based
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payment models.75 Not only does an increased focus on quality generally tend to decrease
incentives to commit fraud, but the partnering CBO would refer a steady stream of patients to the
HHA.
Under the Geriatric Resources for Assessment and Care of Elders (“GRACE”) model,
support teams comprised of nurse practitioners and social workers meet with the elderly patient
to conduct an initial assessment. This team then meets with a larger GRACE interdisciplinary
team consisting of a geriatrician, pharmacist, physical therapist, mental health social worker, and
a community-based liaison to develop an individualized care plan alongside with the patient’s
primary care physician. By maintaining an electronic medical record and longitudinal tracking
system, the GRACE support team coordinates and implements the plan across multiple sites of
care. This is an effective model to combat fraud in home health for several reasons. By having a
team create an individualized prospective plan of care for the patient, the number of medically
unnecessary treatments and hospital readmission rates will decrease.76 While a GRACE model is
ultimately cost-neutral compared to usual care patients, it does improve quality care while
weeding out fraudulent providers through an atmosphere of cross-verification and transparency
created through a team setting.77
Independence at Home Demonstration (“IHD”) is another model whereby home-based
primary care teams, at the direction of physicians and nurse practitioners, provide comprehensive
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medical care to patients with multiple chronic conditions.78 Similar to the MACRA value-based
payment structure, IHDs would reward health care providers that provide high quality care while
reducing cost. Such an organization would need experience in providing home-based primary
care to patients with multiple chronic conditions and service at least 200 eligible beneficiaries.79
The primary care teams would include physician assistants, pharmacists, social workers, and
other staff to create a care plan for the patient. According to test results garnered by CMS, this is
an effective model that provides more comprehensive care to the individual while decreasing
cost.
Committing to the Yates Memo
In addition to changing the overall structure of organizations, providing home health
services, and improving integration, the government must also ensure the continuation of
regulations already in place. The Yates Memo helped hold organizations and individual leaders,
including corporate directors and executives, more accountable for fraudulent business activity.80
While increasing accountability for HHA leaders does not automatically reduce fraud within
their organizations, a strong correlation exists between bad actor executives and organizations
that tend to commit fraud. Recent settlements with health care providers include government
announcements emphasizing the inclusion of corporate leaders in the resolutions, reminiscent of
policy changes promulgated by the Yates Memo.81 Some recent individual punishments include
fines in excess of $1 million and multi-year exclusions from participating in federal health care
programs.82 Leaders can no longer “look the other way” without risking severe penalties and
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public exposure. With the uncertainty and lack of clear direction under the Trump
administration over maintaining these policy changes, a renewed focus on holding individuals, as
well as organizations, accountable for fraudulent practices is imperative. Maintaining HHS
strike force teams, thorough audits, and focusing on big data go hand in hand with individual
accountability and the need for regulatory enforcement.
Rethinking Duggan
Another major consideration is re-assessing the main cause for the expanded scope and
size of home health care in the first place. Indeed, home health care did not present much of a
problem until its emphasis switched from short-term care to the care of patients with chronic
conditions. Legislation could be introduced to override or correct for the holding in Duggan v.
Bowen, which essentially eliminated the “part-time or intermittent” requirement. By imposing
stricter limits on the number of visits organizations can make in a week, home health services
would be forced to provide better quality care during the visits they do make. With the transition
to a value-based payment model, however, such an imposition would be less necessary if the
goal is to disincentivize HHAs from performing medically unnecessary procedures. Reestablishing a stricter limit would also hamper integrated delivery system models, such as the
Independence at Home demonstration, that are designed to provide more comprehensive care
while lowering costs. Prior to the Omnibus Act and the holding in Duggan v. Bowen, visitation
limits to four times per week and 100-visits per episode, limited the profit motive for HHAs and
made medical services more efficient. Re-establishing these limitations, however, would
exclude patients from cost-effective, higher quality benefits home health services may provide
for chronically ill patients that require constant visitation by aides and medical personnel.
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Other Proposed Solutions that Should Not be Implemented
One potential solution, posed by both political parties and various scholars, is to require
beneficiary co-payments. As an area of health care fully covered by Medicare, some believe that
creating a small financial burden would simultaneously decrease the overall number of home
health participants and make those that already receive home health services more conscious
about how their copayments are spent. Though theoretically possible, studies show that this
cost-sharing scheme would not deter individuals from home health care and would only increase
the financial burden of an increasingly elderly and sick population. 83 In any case, benefits
derived from this cost-sharing scheme would only constitute marginal benefits that may not be
worth the cost of placing financial burdens on patients. Other remedies, including other costsaving measures, may more effectively curb fraud and abuse without imposing a financial burden
on beneficiaries or decreasing the quality of home health care.
Another possible solution is to transfer home service patients, especially those with
chronic conditions, to other Medicare and Medicaid services like nursing home facilities and
hospitals. In terms of combating fraud, arguments can be made that auditing for fraudulent
practices would be easier with a centralized location where an auditor can more readily
interrogate patients and staff of the facility. Despite catering to a similar demographic, elderly
patients with chronic conditions, nursing homes and home health care currently serve two
distinct, albeit similar, purposes. A patient qualifies for nursing care when they are a hospital
inpatient for over three days, are certified by the physician that skilled daily care is required, and
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care is delivered by skilled nursing or rehabilitation staff.84 In other words, nursing homes are
meant to provide 24/7 care, which includes assisted living services beyond the medical care a
resident ordinarily receives. The other primary difference between nursing home and home care
is the method of payment: Medicare typically covers home services while Medicaid generally
reimburses for nursing home care. While reimbursement rates for Medicaid are considerably
lower than Medicare, home health care costs less than many nursing homes or other assistedliving facilities.85 A patient transfer from HHAs to nursing homes would not be a viable option,
given that the ultimate goal is to rein in costs and reduce fraud. Any potential benefit to improve
a patient’s experience would be negligible compared to the increase in overall costs for
medically unnecessary treatment and assisted-living services for patients who only require part
time and intermittent care.
While increasing penalties and HHA audits may elicit marginal benefits, they would not
solve the systematic root problems of a health care sector originally intended for short-term and
acute care at the birth of the Medicare and Medicaid Act. Current penalties are harsh and
increasing them will not cause a significant decrease in fraudulent billing. Physicians who
falsely certify Medicare beneficiaries for home health care, for instance, are subject to a civil
monetary penalty of up to three times the amount of remuneration offered or paid.86 In addition
to treble damages, each additional false claim is subject to up to $11,000 in fines under the False
Claim Act.87 Thus, a few violations can quickly and drastically increase fines. Imposing harsher
penalties may also have the unintended consequence of deterring providers from entering the
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home health field in the first place. Similarly, increasing the number audits has limited effects
because of the private nature of home health. While hospitals and other medical facilities allow
CMS and HHS auditors to visit and interrogate patients, privacy concerns restrict auditors from
doing the same with residential homes.
IV. Conclusion
Since its inclusion in Medicare in 1965, home health care transformed from a small
sector meant to provide short-term and post-acute care to a rapidly growing health care service
that is experiencing near-epidemic levels of fraud. While the switch to quality and patient-based
care brought on by the ACA and MACRA will continue to combat fraudulent activity in home
health care, these initiatives will not eliminate fraud within a health care sector fundamentally
different from its original purpose and state. Home health care remains an important service that
is both cheaper and important to eligible beneficiaries.
The best way to curb fraud is with a combination of strict government enforcement and
promoting initiatives that align incentives between HHAs and patients. The government must
continue to hold individual executives and other high-level employees in Home Health Agencies
accountable for fraudulent practices. As part of the transition from volume to value-based care
in the health care industry, the federal government should also explore methods that further
encourage HHAs to join integrated delivery system models. Ultimately, it is in the home health
care industry’s own self-interest to integrate within the wider health care community – a step that
promises to streamline care, decrease fraud, and improve overall patient health. Integration, as
well as vigilant enforcement of existing policies, may make home health care the bedrock for
efficient and higher quality care within the American health care system.
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